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ABSTRACT
Study of Fragility Functions for Assessing Damage to Water Pipe Networks Caused by
Earthquake Loading
Dylan Joseph Merlo

The performance of water lifelines during seismic events is an area of ongoing research. In this
study we evaluate eight (8) different seismic events and the impact that ground shaking and
ground deformations had on water pipeline systems. The overall goal of this work is to provide
municipalities and utility providers with tools for mitigating the consequences of seismic hazards
on water lifeline systems by analyzing the accuracy of damage estimation models. Three (3)
different repair rate models are evaluated using data collected from the seismic events and
compared to observed repair rate data. Results are analyzed to examine the utility of the models
for forecasting damage. Results are shown. The overall goal of this work is to provide
municipalities and utility providers with tools for mitigating the consequences of seismic hazards
on water lifeline systems by analyzing the accuracy of damage estimation models.

Results indicate that fragility functions that utilize a linear PGV-based function are the most
accurate in predicting repair rates to a system based on residual plots developed for different
models. Differentiating between continuous and segmented water lifeline systems is best done by
using coefficients to modify the backbone PGV-based equation. Results also indicate that utilizing
an additional PGD-based function could increase the predictive capabilities of water lifeline
system fragility functions.

Keywords: fragility functions, lifelines, earthquake, earthquake engineering, risk analysis, risk
assessment, statistical modeling, water system, waterline, water network
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION

The development of fragility functions is a key component in characterizing the risk associated with
seismic events interacting with built infrastructure. Silva, et al., 2019 defines the three main
components of seismic risk portfolios as follows: (1) seismic hazard models, (2) exposure data sets,
and (3) a set of vulnerability functions, further mentioning the importance of understanding the
limitations and potential biases in the practice of exploring functions that increase the reliability of
results. The purpose of this research is to focus on the third item in the list, noting that the first two
items have been explored extensively and established tools from the USGS exist to create hazard
models and exposure data sets. For the purposes of this research, fragility functions are defined
as a set of equations that assess the probabilistic risk of built infrastructure to fail under a given
stressor. Fragility functions are typically derived from prior observations of earthquake performance
of specific lifelines. These damage assessments combined with recorded data from the earthquake
inform probabilistic models with hopes of predicting damage caused by potential seismic hazards
in the future. Because of this event specific reliance on the creation of fragility functions, historically,
fragility functions have been developed for each site on a case-by-case basis rather than comparing
and assessing functions to be predictive independent from location. In order to better prepare
systems for future seismic hazards, a comprehensive function could be developed to assess a
given lifeline’s response for design hazards.
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Chapter 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

Current fragility functions for lifelines (FEMA and Eidinger, 2001) utilize peak ground velocity (PGV)
and permanent ground deformation (PGD) based functions that often overestimate repairs in
regions with large ground deformations, and underestimate repairs in areas with little to no ground
deformations (Bellagamba, Bradley, Wotherspoon, & Hughes, 2019). This suggests the need for
more comprehensive models that account for a variety of variables that affect the repair rates of
lifelines caused by an earthquake. The variability in data availability can make these types of
models difficult to develop, but these models could have better predictive capabilities and could be
used when data is available. Historically, damage estimation for buried lifelines have faced
numerous challenges including reliably estimating damage for continuous pipeline systems,
differentiating between leaks and breaks when estimating pipe repair rates using fragility functions,
damage estimation by pipe orientation, and enhanced fragility relations considering special soil and
wave propagation conditions (Pineda-Porras & Najafi, 2010).

2.1

Factors Affecting Water System Performance Under Seismic Loading

The resiliency of water systems to seismic events has been studied at different levels, especially
since the 1990’s. Early studies, such as O'Rourke & Jeon (1999) and Eidinger (2001) have set out
to define significant factors contributing to a water systems’ damage due to an earthquake.
Variables determined to influence the performance of water systems can be grouped into two
categories:
1. variables pertaining to the pipeline’s resistance (i.e., pipe material and pipe diameter, joints,
etc.), and
2. variables pertaining to the earthquake load (i.e., PGV, PGD, and liquefaction susceptibility).
Detailed below are some of the significant contributing factors pertaining to pipeline damage
during an earthquake as generally agreed upon in the reviewed literature.

2

2.1.1

Pipeline Factors:

Pipeline material is often the most investigated factor when evaluating a pipeline’s resiliency to
seismic events. Many studies have been conducted with a variety of differing material data sets
that have analyzed how different pipeline materials respond to earthquake loads by doing case
study reviews (Eidinger, 2001) and strain resistance testing (Abdoun, et al., 2009). These studies
vary in the amount of other information they consider such as bury depth, trench backfill type, and
diameter. This leads to conclusions that can sometimes be conflicting and makes the ordering of
materials by resiliency to seismic forces difficult. However, there is general consensus that brittle
pipes such as asbestos cement (AC), cast iron (CI), and galvanized iron (GI) tend to fail more
frequently and are more damaged than ductile pipes such as steel, ductile iron (DI), HDPE, and
PVC (Eidinger, 2001; Bagriacik, Davidson, Hughes, Bradley, & Cubrinovki, 2018; Bellagamba,
Bradley, Wotherspoon, & Hughes, 2019; Abdoun, et al., 2009).

Other factors include pipe diameter, pipe age, pipe type, and trench backfill type. Pipe diameter
has also been studied closely with general consensus that larger diameter pipes perform better
than smaller diameter pipes. This is reflected in the factor tables presented in Eidinger (2001) and
in the studies presented by Cubrinovski, et al. (2014) and O'Rourke, et al. (2014) and is most likely
due to the increased thickness in larger pipes. Pipe age could be a general indicator of pipe
condition which could affect pipe performance especially with pipe materials that are more readily
corrodible. Classifying pipes based on use (such as transmission mains which are generally larger
pipes pressurized by pumps, conveying water long distances from treatment systems or reservoirs
to storage tanks, versus distribution mains which are typically smaller in diameter, under less
pressure, and follow city streets to serve users), could provide a way to determine pipes that may
be operating at larger pressures, which may be more susceptible to failure and also would help in
assessing the severity of a broken pipe and the number of users/facilities potentially affected by
failure. Cubrinovki et al. (2014) suggests that leading modes of pipe failures are pipe bursting and
longitudinal splitting which are caused by a pipe being subjected to extreme pressures from within.
3

Circumferential splits due to differential ground movements lead to failures in the pipe body. These
body failures can cause high pressure hydraulic transients, or sudden and sharp pressure surges
(a.k.a. water hammer) to occur upstream or downstream of the body failure, leading to pipe
bursting. These high-pressure hydraulic transients can also cause pressure surges elsewhere in a
system leading to failures at other components (i.e., fittings, joints, and pumps). Trench backfill
type can also influence the performance of a water pipeline. Depending on the liquefaction
susceptibility of the native soil, backfilling with native soil could be more desirable or less desirable
for pipe performance (Cubrinovksi et al., 2014).

Pipelines can be classified as either continuous or segmented depending on how they are joined
and how the system functions when subjected to ground motion and deformation. Continuous
pipelines are typically characterized by welded joints (e.g., steel pipe with welded joints) whereas
segmented pipes are typically made of concrete, CI, or AC and a weaker joint (e.g., cast iron pipe
with lead caulked joints) (Pineda-Porras, O., Najafi, M., 2010). Historically, fragility functions have
been developed for segmented pipes and not continuous pipes (Pineda-Porras, O., Najafi, M.,
2010). Some studies have suggested applying coefficients to fragility functions for segmented pipes
to estimate the damage to continuous pipes, however, there tends to be no basis for establishing
these multiplicative coefficients used in the literature (Eidinger, 2001; O’Rourke and Ayala, 1993).
This is mainly due to the lack of empirical evidence of damage caused by wave propagation to
continuous pipeline systems (Pineda-Porras & Najafi, 2010). Further studies into fragility relations
between continuous water pipeline networks and wave propagation could provide guidance on how
to address damage estimation for these types of pipe networks. Classifying pipelines as either
continuous or segmented could provide a basis for determining what earthquake loading
parameters would govern damages to a system (wave propagation or ground deformations).

Another common area of failure along a pipeline system are pipe fittings. Cubrinovksi et al., (2014)
cites water hammer as a reason. Due to the nature of fittings (joining different sticks of pipe), they
mark areas of discontinuity and stress concentration within a system. For segmented pipe systems,
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this would be a reasonable place for a system to fail if the fitting were not able to allow for deflections
or was subject to differential ground forces or deformation on any connected pipes (Eidinger,
2001).

2.1.2

Earthquake Parameters

In understanding the effects that an earthquake has on a waterline, parameters from the
earthquake must be considered. Typical parameters invoked when evaluating the interaction
between an earthquake and the built environment include moment magnitude (M w), peak ground
acceleration (PGA), peak ground velocity (PGV), peak ground displacement (PGD), cyclic
resistance ratio (CRR), and cyclic stress ratio (CSR). Through historical review of fragility relations
for buried pipelines, Pineda-Porras & Najafi (2010) note that PGV is most often used for the
formulation of fragility relations of lifeline systems such as buried pipelines, because PGV is tends
to produce better fitting models than do models using PGA. Pineda-Porras & Najafi (2010) cite two
primary reasons for PGV being a better indicator of pipeline damage than PGA:
1. PGV is directly related to ground strain, which is directly related to pipeline
performance and damages caused by wave propagation.
2. PGA is more related to inertial forces which do not affect buried infrastructure such as
pipelines.
However, it should be noted that for soft soils another indicator, PGV2/PGA, may be better
correlated to repair rates of buried pipelines than just PGV alone as it is strongly related to PGD
(Pineda-Porras & Najafi, 2010). More research should investigate the effectiveness of this indicator
in relation to damage estimates for buried pipelines in soft soils, but also as a potential replacement
for PGD which can be hard to predict and map compared to PGA and PGV.

Pipe damage caused by permanent ground deformation (PGD) such as liquefaction, lateral
spreading, or seismic induced differential settlement, is another fragility relation typically developed
when estimating damages to buried pipeline infrastructure caused by seismic forces. Hazus®-MH
2.1 FEMA’s hazard damage loss estimator utilizes a PGD function developed by Honegger and
5

Eguchi (1992), which also accounts for the probability of liquefaction based on CRR and CSR
values. Other discretized methods for estimating liquefaction and PGD have been proposed as
summarized in Bagriacik et al. (2018).

2.2

Review of Fragility Functions for Water Systems

For the purposes of this study, three fragility functions were reviewed that estimate the damage to
buried waterlines during earthquake events. The three selected functions include functions
developed in Eidinger (2001) and utilized in the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s
(FEMA’s) disaster damage estimator, HAZUS®-MH 2.1. The third fragility function was developed
in Bellagamba et al. (2019) and utilized data from the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence (CES) to
develop fragility functions for buried waterlines. Each model is reviewed in detail below.

2.2.1

Fragility Functions Presented in Eidinger (2001)

G&E Engineering System Inc. conducted a thorough development of seismic fragility functions for
water systems. The purpose of developing these functions was to create fragility functions “formed
in a transparent way” so that the process could be reviewed, and the equations could be modified
over time with the availability of more data available. Although this study encompasses the
development of fragility functions for a wide variety of water infrastructure (pumping plants,
treatment plants, dams, etc.), for the purposes of this research, only the development of the water
conveyance system is discussed. Eidinger (2001) based the development of damage algorithms
primarily on empirical evidence. 164 raw data points (i.e., pipe break logs) were collected for use
in this report from 18 different earthquake events in various countries (United States, Japan,
Nicaragua, Mexico) from 1906-1995. The data was analyzed for two different modes of failure:
wave propagation and permanent ground deformation. Data was normalized and screened in an
attempt to only capture damage to main pipes due to a median PGV. The vetted data included 81
data points from 12 earthquakes. Materials analyzed include cast iron (38 points), steel (13),
asbestos cement (10), ductile iron (9), and concrete (2), with 9 data points including cast and ductile
iron pipe combined. 8 points were determined to be pipes with diameters greater than 12-inches.
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PGV was found to positively correlate with repair rate, so PGV-based equations were developed.
Likewise, the data points were screened to include earthquakes in which large amounts of PGD
and liquefaction were recorded. 42 data points were used from four earthquakes. Material types
include asbestos cement (20 points), cast iron (17), cast iron and steel mixed (5). Linear and power
models were fitted to the data points above for both PGV and PGD.

The results of the PGV-based regression (Error! Reference source not found.) shows that the
linear and power models are about the same in estimating repair rates. Eidinger (2001)
recommends the use of the linear function for simplicity of analysis and utilizes the linear model to
derive coefficients for various pipe materials and joint types. Eidinger (2001) provides a table of
coefficients (Table 1) to modify the recommended backbone fragility function based on pipe
material and joint type. Pipe diameter was also analyzed but since the sample set only contained
8 data points for large diameter pipes, there was not enough data to conclude anything about the
relative fragility between large and small diameter pipes. The linear model was compared to several
others including “HAZUS®-MH 2.1 brittle pipe [NIBS, 1997], Eguchi et al. (1983) cast iron pipe,
Eidinger (1998) cast iron pipe, and Toprak (1998) cast iron pipe.” Results (Figure 2) show that
repair rate and loss predictions are less with the linear model than the HAZUS®-MH 2.1, Eidinger
(1998) or Eguchi et al. (1983) models, whereas the repair rates are similar to the Toprak (1998)
model. This could be because the data for the Toprak (1998) model came from the Northridge
earthquake, which also comprised a large dataset for the PGV linear model.
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Figure 1: A comparison of linear and power PGV-based fits (from Eidinger, 2001).

8

Figure 2. Linear PGV model fit compared to other fragility functions (from Eidinger, 2001).

9

Table 1: Coefficients to modify the PGV-based equation recommended by Eidinger, 2001.

The results of fitting the data to linear and power models for PGD (Figure 3) show that the power
model is a better overall fit, as the linear model underestimates damages at a greater extent than
the power model at larger PGD values. However, for relatively small PGDs the power model could
overestimate repair rates as shown in the low PGD range of Figure 3. The PGD-based fragility
function developed in Eidinger (2001) compared to other PGD-based fragility functions (Figure 4)
shows that the model provides similar damage estimates to the HAZUS® Model 1997 for PGD but
has much lower damage estimates when compared to other models such as the Eidinger Model
1998 and the Harding-Lawson Model 1991.
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Figure 3: A comparison of linear and power PGD-based fits (from Eidinger, 2001).
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Figure 4. Comparison of fragility functions based on PGD (from Eidinger, 2001).

A summary of the fragility function developed in Eidinger (2001) are shown in Table 2 below.
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Table 2. Fragility functions from Eidinger 2001.

2.2.2

Fragility Functions used in HAZUS®-MH 2.1 Software

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) developed the HAZUS® software in 1997
as part of a way for agencies and utility providers to better assess system performance under
different disaster scenarios. HAZUS® is a GIS based software that can be used with other GIS
databases (i.e., utility information) to estimate damage during different disasters (i.e., earthquakes,
flooding, hurricanes, coastal surges, tsunamis). Specifically, it provides agencies with a tool to
assess where their systems may be vulnerable and provides an estimate at the economic loss due
to such hazards. It does this in a three-step process by first calculating the exposure to hazards in
a user-defined area, second by assessing the intensity of the hazard in the exposed area, and
finally by calculating potential loss from the hazard. For the purposes of this research, focus will be
on the third step of estimating potential loss from a hazard.

HAZUS®-MH 2.1 derives its fragility functions for lifelines during earthquakes from two studies:
O'Rourke & Ayala (1993) provide the PGV based function, and Honegger & Eguchi (1992) provide
the PGD based function. The development of each of the equations is detailed below and the
fragility functions used in HAZUS®-MH 2.1 are provided in Table 3.
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Table 3. Fragility functions utilized in HAZUS®-MH 2.1 Software.

Note: Acronyms for Table 3 are as follows: RR: repair-rate, CI: cast-iron pipe, AC: asbestoscement pipe, RCC: reinforced-concrete pipe, DI: ductile-iron pipe, S: steel pipe.
O’Rourke and Ayala (1993) expanded previously recorded data from Barenberg (1988) to include
repair rate data from 3 additional earthquakes, two Mexican earthquakes (Michoacan, 1985;
Tláuac, 1989) and the Coalinga, California earthquake in 1983. Data was isolated to account only
for damage due to wave propagation, a method first used in Eguchi (1983) (O’Rourke and Ayala,
1993). A best fit line was developed based on the data. The results (Figure 5) show a more strongly
correlated relationship between PGV and pipeline repair rate than developed in Barenberg (1988).
O’Rourke and Ayala (1993) cite the reasons for increased correlation being corroded pipes in
Coalinga which led to an increased in recorded damages for that event, and the Michoacan
earthquake led to increased damage due to closed basin effects in propagating, reflecting, and
amplifying seismic waves within the dried up lakebed basin. Data provided in this study was plotted
and fitted for use in the HAZUS®-MH 2.1 software. The fitted equation was for brittle pipes only,
and the HAZUS®-MH 2.1 technical manual recommends multiplying the fitted equation by 0.3 to
estimate damage for ductile pipes although the manual does not provide a basis for doing so.
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Figure 5. PGV repair rate fragility function from O’Rourke and Ayala (1993) data (from
FEMA, 2003)

Honegger and Eguchi (1992) equations were developed from a study conducted on behalf of the
San Diego County Water Authority. The data from the study looked at previous damage to pipelines
due to PGD and estimate repair rates were fitted with the equation as shown. As in the PGV-based
fragility functions, the HAZUS®-MH 2.1 technical manual (FEMA 2003) recommends using a 0.3
factor when estimating damages caused by PGD to ductile pipes but does not provide a basis for
doing so. Figure 6 shows the fitted equation from the Honegger and Eguchi (1992) data.
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Figure 6. PGD repair rate fragility function from Honegger and Eguchi (1992) data (from
FEMA, 2003)

2.2.3

Fragility Functions Developed in Bellagamba, Bradley, Wotherspoon, & Hughes

(2019)
Between 2010 and 2011, Canterbury, New Zealand was struck with a series of earthquakes known
as the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence (CES). The series included a Mw 7.1 (September 2010),
a Mw 6.0 (June 2011) in Darfield, a Mw 6.2 (February 2011), and Mw 5.8 (December 2011) in
Christchurch. The Christchurch urban areas experienced liquefaction that damaged infrastructure
throughout the city. After these earthquake events, much research went into understanding how
earthquakes interact with the built environment, including how seismic forces and deformations
affect lifelines systems. The model developed by Bellagamba, Bradley, Wotherspoon, & Hughes,
(2019) is shown below for reference in Equation 1. Coefficients for the model are presented in
Table 4. As Table 4 shows, the model develops fragility relations for water lifeline systems using
five parameters. The five parameters are PGV, pipe performance group (how well the material
functions under seismic loading), pipe material, pipe diameter, and cyclic resistance ratio (CRR).
16

Modeling uncertainty is accounted for using an error term with zero mean and measured within and
between uncertainty (i.e., random effects or mixed effects modeling).

ln(𝜆) = [𝑎0 𝑃𝐺𝑉𝑏0 + 𝑐0 ] + [𝑎1 𝑃𝐺𝑉 + 𝑏1 ] + [𝑎2 𝑃𝐺𝑉 + 𝑏2 ]
+ [𝑎3 𝑃𝐺𝑉 + 𝑏3 ] + [𝑎4 𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑏4 + 𝑐4 ] + 𝜀
2
Where: 𝜀~𝒩(0, √𝜎𝑊
+ 𝜎𝐵2 )

17

(Eq. 1)

Table 4. Table of coefficients for model developed by Bellagamba et al. (2019)
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However, the model is limited in its extent in predicting lifeline repair rates because the model was
generated for a specific water system after specific seismic events. Coefficients were only
developed for pipe materials and diameters pertaining to the water lifeline system of Christchurch,
which does not include many water pipe materials commonly used. The model, although
accounting for ground deformations in estimating the repairs to a water system, does so by using
CRR as a parameter which can be difficult to predict over the entirety of a water system as CRR
data is limited to point testing and can be difficult to map accurately over large regions. Without
coefficients that are reflective of the water system analyzed and for areas where little to no
information is available regarding CRR, the model becomes increasingly less reliable.

The model was developed assuming a Poisson distribution of repairs along pipelines, a practice
adopted by many previous studies (O’Rourke and Ayala, 1993; Eidinger J. , 1998; O’Rourke et al.,
2014; etc.) where the repair rate, expressed as λ, is given by Equation 2.

𝑛

ln(𝜆) = 𝑓0 (𝑃𝐺𝑉) + ∑ 𝐶𝑖 (ℎ𝑖 ) + 𝜀

(Eq. 2)

𝑖=1

As Equation 2 shows, the model is a function of PGV and modified by the correction factors, C i,
based on the n-th known parameter, hi. In the case of the model developed by Bellagamba, Bradley,
Wotherspoon, & Hughes (2019), these correction factors are related to pipeline characteristics. To
correct the repair rate based on liquefaction susceptibility, the CRR correction term was created.
The uncertainty factor, 𝜀, accounts for function misfits, unknown parameters, and randomness.
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Chapter 3
DATA AND METHODOLOGY

Data regarding the water system’s performance post-earthquake was collected for different
earthquake events from a variety of sources. The eight (8) scenarios chosen to evaluate the
previously listed models were the 2010 earthquake in Concepción, Chile, the 2011 earthquake in
Van, Turkey, the 2011 Tohoku, Japan earthquake, the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake, the 1994
Northridge earthquake, the two earthquakes in Christchurch, New Zealand in February and June
2011 and the 1995 Kobe, Japan earthquake. ASCE’s Technical Council on Lifeline Earthquake
Engineering (TCLEE) reports were reviewed to collect data from the Van, Turkey; Concepcion,
Chile; and Tohoku, Japan earthquake events regarding water system pipeline damages. The
appendices of Eidinger 2001 provided the water system pipeline repair rate data for the
Northridge and Loma Prieta earthquake events.
Other seismic event data was available in Eidinger 2001, however only events that recorded PGV
and repair rate were utilized for the purposes of this study. The Northridge and Loma Prieta
earthquakes were the only events that met these criteria. Data regarding the Christchurch water
system damage from the earthquake events in February and June 2011 was gathered from
O'Rourke, et al., (2014) and data for the Kobe, Japan earthquake came from an edition of the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The selected earthquakes were chosen
based on data availability, with an effort to capture ranges of intensity in a variety of significant
earthquake forces (i.e., wave propagation, liquefaction, PGD). Another intent was to validate
models with data from different locations internationally, to determine the effectiveness of the
model in accounting for the variety of construction codes and requirements pertaining to different
cities, municipalities, and/or countries. Below, each earthquake event is described in detail along
with information regarding the water system and repairs made to the system. A summary of the
collected data can be found in Appendix A1.
3.1 Earthquake Events
3.1.1

Concepción, Chile (2010)
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Chile experienced a Mw 8.8 earthquake off the coast of the Maule region in Chile on February 27,
2010. The earthquake occurred along the plate Nazcan and South American plate boundaries.
The subduction earthquake caused an additional 130 aftershocks of magnitude 6 or greater for
the following week. The initial shaking caused a tsunami that hit the coast of Chile minutes after
the seismic event. Peak ground accelerations recorded reached up to 0.65g in the Concepción
area. The horizontal peak mean ground velocity was 59.5 cm/s (67.3 cm/s north-south, 51.7 cm/s
east-west) (TCLEE, 2013). The geologic conditions varied widely due to the epicentral region of
the earthquake. Little liquefaction and lateral spreading occurred across the epicentral region,
however various areas had high levels of liquefaction and lateral spreading mainly due to soft
soils and sometimes perched groundwater tables (TCLEE, 2013); this was especially true in
Concepción, where liquefaction and lateral spreading occurred near riverbanks where movement
was between a few inches and a few feet laterally. PGDs were recorded up to 76 cm.

The earthquake caused extensive damage to the lifeline systems from the effects of seismic
wave propagation and ground deformations (liquefaction and lateral spreading). Concepción’s
water systems were damaged at various locations including pipelines, water treatment plants,
and pumping stations. The water systems in Concepción are owned and operated by a variety of
entities. Essbio, a water provider in Chile, serves urban communities in Concepción. All the
community systems operated by Essbio are independent from one another. The total length of
Essbio water lines in Concecpión is approximately 1,200 km. The earthquake caused 72 breaks
in large diameter (500+ mm diameter) welded steel pipes. 3,000 repairs occurred in small
diameter pipes, approximately 1,000 of those repairs occurring in water mains and the other
2,000 in service laterals. The net leak rate (water loss) before the earthquake was estimated at
40%, and after the recorded 3,000 repairs, the leak rate was approximately 60%, suggesting that
the damage rate to the pipes may have been more extensive than recorded in TCLEE (2013).

3.1.2

Van, Turkey (2011)
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The earthquake in Van, Turkey (2011) was a Mw 7.2 due to a blind thrust fault of the Anatolian
Block (located between the Arabian and Eurasian plate). A second earthquake followed 17 days
after of a Mw 5.6 and was believed to be caused by a strike slip fault, with rupture directivity
towards the city of Van. This caused extensive damage in the city. The first earthquake was
characterized by PGVs ranging between 10-12 cm/s (at the time of the earthquake the strong
motion stations in Van were not operating, and so this range was estimated from stations in
Muradiye and Bitilis [EQE-KOERI, 2011]. The second earthquake had peak ground velocities
ranging from 10cm/s to 20cm/s for stiff and soft soils, respectively.

The water system in Van was built in the 1980’s and is operated by the Municipality of Van. The
system consists mostly of pipes made of prestressed reinforced concrete (RC), asbestos cement
(AC), and PVC. In the initial earthquake (Mw 7.2) no water service was interrupted and so it was
believed that no damage had occurred in the water system. However, after a more thorough
examination of the system, many leaks were discovered. The series of earthquakes and
aftershocks caused cumulative damage in the system before repairs could happen. The water
system was assessed by the Municipality of Van and the Bank of Municipalities of Van, jointly.
Damage points were defined as any breakage or leakage at connections. After the Mw=7.2
earthquake 8-16 damage points were identified and there were 30-40 damage points in the
second event (Mw=5.6). There was no sign of ground failure in the city of Van, so all damage was
assumed to be caused by wave propagation. In northern Van, the transmission waterline was
subjected to liquefaction induced lateral spreading that caused ground deformations up to 40 cm.
This caused a pipe to break 8 times within a 600-meter segment (Uckan, 2013).

3.1.3

Tohoku, Japan (2011)

The magnitude 9.0 earthquake occurred on March 11, 2011 approximately 70 km off the coast of
the Oshika Peninsula of the Tohuku region. The hypocenter was approximately 29 km
underwater. The earthquake was a megathrust event with the Pacific Plate subducting under
Honshu’s underlying plate. The city of Sendai (the closest city center to the epicenter)
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experienced a PGV of 11 inches/second (approximately 28 cm/s). The earthquake caused large
tsunamis that inundated the Sendai plain and caused extensive damage and life loss in the
region. Tsunamis proved to be the leading cause of damage and life loss from, including the
meltdown of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant.

The potable water system was largely undamaged by the tsunami except from erosion effects
and where pipes were exposed above ground (i.e., bridge crossings). The strong ground shaking,
and ground deformations did damage water systems in several areas. Sendai’s transmission
main line (from 48-inches to 90-inches) which supplies the majority of the City’s freshwater from a
reservoir 50 miles southwest of the city was damaged in 53 locations. Liquefaction caused
damage at a water treatment plant and other damages to water pipes throughout the region.
Sendai City totaled 120 repairs to their water system pipeline network after the earthquake. A
third of the damages were at appurtenance (such as fire hydrants and valves) or on large
diameter (greater than 400 mm) pipes. Pipes that had been seismically designed (installed after
the 1995 Kobe earthquake) or seismically retrofitted fared much better than other pipes and
suffered minimal damages. Settlement in the hills of Sendai caused roads and houses to settle,
affecting much of the small diameter distribution pipes in these areas (Wakamatsu, Nagata,
Maruyama, & Ozawa, 2016).

3.1.4

Loma Prieta, California (1989)

The Loma Prieta earthquake occurred in October of 1989. The Mw 6.9 earthquake is named for
its epicenter in the southern Santa Cruz Mountains along the San Andreas fault (11 miles from
Santa Cruz and 60 miles from San Francisco). The earthquake caused minor damages to areas
around the epicenter, but the majority of damages (and associated repair costs) occurred in San
Francisco and Oakland. PGV ranged from 10 cm/s to 45 cm/s throughout the region depending
on soil type and distance from the epicenter. Ground deformations, primarily liquefaction, were
prominent in San Francisco and Oakland near the Pacific Ocean and along river and creek
channels. Ground deformations are assumed to have caused failures in the San Francisco
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Municipal Water Supply System (Scawthorn et al., 1991 as cited in National Research Council,
1994). Approximately 350 water main repairs were reported in the San Francisco Bay Area
(including the cities of Oakland, Berkeley, Alameda), 120 repairs in the San Jose area, and 60
repairs in the Monterey Bay Area (Eidinger J. M., 1998). Approximately half of the repairs in the
San Jose area were attributed to corrosion. Most of the repairs occurred in pipes that ranged from
4-inch to 8-inches in diameter and were made of cast iron with fixed bell-and-spigot joints.

3.1.5

Northridge, California (1994)

The Northridge earthquake occurred on January 17, 1994, at an epicenter approximately 30
kilometers northwest of downtown Los Angeles. The seismic moment magnitude (M w) was 6.7.
The earthquake occurred at an intersection of faults, but the causative fault was not mapped prior
to the earthquake event. Peak ground velocities reached up to 170 cm/s and peak ground
accelerations reached 0.98 g near the epicenter (Lund & Cooper, 1995).

Damage to water systems was mostly concentrated north of the seismic event. San Fernando
saw the most damage to their water systems with an estimated 1400 repairs to the distribution
mains and meter connections. Santa Clarita and Simi Valley recorded an estimated 300 repairs
made to their water systems. Pipes failed mainly due to tensile and compressive forces. Some
pipes weakened by corrosion also likely failed due to ground shaking. The most affected pipes
were old cast iron pipes with rigid joints and steel pipes that had become corroded (Lund &
Cooper, 1995).

3.1.6

Christchurch, New Zealand (February 2011)

On February 22, 2011, Canterbury experienced an earthquake of seismic moment magnitude
(Mw) 6.2. The earthquake’s epicenter was 6.7 kilometers southeast of Christchurch. The
hypocenter of the quake was relatively shallow at only 5 km from the surface. The earthquake
occurred on a “blind” fault or an unknown fault. The proximity of the quake to a large urban area
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and the shallow depth of the hypocenter were significant contributing factors to the severity of the
earthquake on the built environment. Another significant factor was the soil strata in parts of
Christchurch which caused widespread liquefaction. It should be noted that infrastructure had
previously been stressed in September 2010 by a Mw 7.1 earthquake and subsequent
aftershocks. The damage of infrastructure in the February quake was more significant for the
reasons mentioned previously. A spectral map of PGVs developed from strong ground motion
stations is shown below in Figure 7.

Figure 7. Geometric mean PGV of the 2011 February Christchurch earthquake (Bradley,
2014 as cited in Bellagamba, Bradley, Wotherspoon, & Hughes, 2019).

The water system was greatly affected by the seismic forces in this quake. In the immediate
aftermath of the earthquake, there was no drinking water supply to 80% of the city of
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Christchurch. As expected, in areas with liquefaction, the repair rates for pipelines were much
greater than in areas with little to no evidence of liquefaction, with damage rates reaching up to
2.4 repairs per kilometer for brittle pipes (O'Rourke, et al., 2014). The entirety of the system
sustained damages at an average of nearly 1 repair per kilometer of pipe.
3.1.7

Christchurch, New Zealand (June 2011)

On the June 13, 2011, Mw 6.0 earthquake, the epicenter 5 km southeast of Christchurch at a
depth of 7 km. The shallow quake amplified damages caused by the February 2011 earthquake
and stalled or regressed many restoration efforts. The earthquake was a direct result of the strikeslip faulting at the rupture zone of the February 22, 2011 earthquake. Figure 8 shows a map of
the mean geometric PGV values from the June event.

Figure 8. Geometric mean PGV of the 2011 June Christchurch earthquake (Bradley, 2014
as cited in Bellagamba, Bradley, Wotherspoon, & Hughes, 2019).
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The damages to the water system were much less severe than in the February event for a variety
of reasons but primarily due to lower geometric mean PGV values and less severe liquefaction. In
areas with evidence of liquefaction, the damage rates were higher than in areas where
liquefaction was not observed. The average repair rate across the entirety of the system was
approximately 0.25 repairs per km (O'Rourke, et al., 2014).

3.1.8

Kobe, Japan (January 1995)

The City of Kobe is on Osaka Bay in central Japan. Most of Kobe City is built on a coastal plain
with two main groups of soil: natural soils and fills. More recent developments had been on sandy
fills in the Osaka Bay. An Mw 6.9 earthquake occurred on January 17, 1995 which struck the
Osaka Bay region leading to one of Japan’s most devastating earthquakes. The earthquake
occurred in a complex faulting region near Awaji Island. The rupture initiated on the Nojima fault
and extended to the ground surface along a 9 km section of the fault located on Awaji Island.
Peak ground shaking was approximately 0.5g in the City and exceeded 0.8g in two of ten of the
measuring instruments. The earthquake caused liquefaction in areas of fill in Osaka Bay which
caused major damage to infrastructure. Figure 9 shows a map produced by Yamazaki et al.
(1999) which estimates distribution of PGV on the ground surface in the Kobe region.
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Figure 9. Estimated PGV distribution from the earthquake in Kobe, Japan (Yamazaki et al.,
1999)

The water system of Kobe serves approximately 1.5 million people. The system delivers potable
water that runs by gravity from the city’s purification plants through a series of tunnels. The water
system has an earthquake monitoring and control system in place to isolate water in selected
reservoirs to maintain a firm drinking water supply. The majority (nearly 90%) of the water
distribution system was composed of either welded steel or ductile iron pipe.

The earthquake event left approximately 1 million households without water following the event,
and only restored 70% of the outages 3 weeks after the event. The water system was stressed in
a variety of ways. Two transmission mains supplying the water purification plants failed in ten
locations. An estimated 1800 pipeline failures were recorded in the distribution network and
presumably the failures occurred at the joints. The distribution network failures were concentrated
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in areas of liquefaction induced lateral spreading. Table 5 provides an inventory of pipe failures,
although the list only shows 964 of the estimated 1800 failures. Pulled joints accounts for
approximately 2/3rds of the pipe failures (Ballantyne, Chung, O'Rourke, & Schiff, 1996).

Table 5. Water pipeline damage table for Kobe City water system (Ballantyne, Chung,
O'Rourke, & Schiff, 1996).
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Chapter 4
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Repair rate estimates were calculated using each of the described models from the data gathered.
Calculated repair rates were compared to measured repair rates in each system. Residuals are
shown for each of the models as a measure of the predictive ability of each model. Two factors of
the residual plot are especially scrutinized to assess the damage models: (1) the proximity of the
residual to zero, signifying the model is accurate and (2) the randomness of the residuals ensuring
that the model does not exhibit a bias with trends that could suggest a model that has been misfit.
Results of the residual analysis were compared to draw conclusions regarding fragility functions for
buried waterlines.

4.1

Model Results

4.1.1

Results of Model Presented in Eidinger, 2001

As mentioned above, two methods of repair rate estimation are proposed in Eidinger, 2001: A wave
propagation and a ground deformation model. For the purposes of this report, only the wave
propagation model was analyzed. Although valuable to know damage estimates caused by
permanent ground deformation, these deformations are often localized and without specific data
for ground deformations experienced by each length of pipe, a simple risk model could produce
wildly inaccurate results. However, with geographic information system (GIS) mapping and
modeling tools, accounting for damage caused by PGD would be valuable and would certainly
enhance accuracy of repair rate damage models.

Repair rate residuals between the estimated repair rate from the model and observed repair rates
are shown in Figure 10 below. Data from the Northridge, Loma Prieta, and Tohoku, Japan
earthquakes have been excluded from the residual graph as the Eidinger, 2001 model has been
already optimized to reduce residuals within this discrete set of data. As stated above, only the
wave propagation model presented in Eidinger, 2001 was used to estimate repair rates and
because of this it would be expected that some repair rates are significantly underestimated
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(positive residual) due to not accounting for damages caused by PGDs. This is evidenced with the
residuals of the Christchurch data from the February 2011 event where liquefaction was observed
throughout the city-center as well as the 1995 Kobe, Japan earthquake where liquefaction was
severe and was attributed as the major reason the distribution system was disrupted heavily
(Ballantyne, Chung, O'Rourke, & Schiff, 1996).

Generally, the damage estimates in the model seem to underpredict (shown as a positive residual)
repair rates to waterlines for earthquake events. The residual of the repair rate is generally
exasperated at higher PGV values. Based on the prevalence of liquefaction that occurred with the
analyzed earthquake events, the significant underprediction of repair rates most likely stems from
the lack of estimating damage caused by PGDs. As mentioned previously, because PGD is site
specific, it is hard to assign a PGD value to a length of pipe without specific site data or a
generalized PDG map. The collection of this kind of data will be valuable in refining models and
estimating damages. However, because PGD values are hard to predict for each pipe when
analyzing systems, a better methodology in estimating repair rates would be to use a liquefaction
susceptibility measurement that would be based on soil conditions, groundwater levels, and
parameters such as cyclic resistance ratio (CRR). Some guidance for creating such maps can be
found in Cubrinovski, et al., (2014).

Using the previously mentioned data sources, only pipes associated with events characterized by
minimum PGDs were evaluated to determine if the underprediction of repair rates from the model
could be attributed to not using the PGD-based fragility functions. The results are shown below in
Figure 11. Although not much data is available to evaluate the effectiveness of the Eidinger, 2001
model in known areas that experienced minimal to no PGDs, the results here suggest that extreme
residuals from the previously presented Figure 10 can be attributed to the lack of accounting for
damage due to PGDs. Figure 11 below shows that using damage data where liquefaction did not
occur and estimating damage using only the wave propagation model, provides small residuals.
Residuals from the data are bounded by +0.5 and 0. Though the residuals seem small, over the
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length of hundreds of kilometers of pipe, the damage estimates could be skewed significantly. For
this reason, pipe segments should be discretized and screened based on guidance from Barenberg
(1988) or O'Rourke et al., (2014), or another peer reviewed screening methodology that allows for
screening of pipe damage logs to evaluate significant, discretized sections of pipe.
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Residual analysis of repair rate using wave propogation model presented in
Eidinger 2001
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Figure 10. Residuals of observed repair rates versus predicted repair rates from the model presented in Eidinger, 2001.
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Residual analysis of repair rate using wave propogation model
presented in Eidinger 2001 in areas where PGD was not significant
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Figure 11. Residuals of observed repair rates versus predicted repair rates from the model presented in Eidinger, 2001 for data points
where little to no PGDs were observed.

34

70

4.1.2

Results of Model Used in HAZUS®-MH 2.1 Software.

As described previously and like the model presented in Eidinger (2001), the HAZUS®-MH 2.1
model provides two different formulas to estimate damage caused by wave propagation and
permanent ground deformations. For the purposes of this analysis, only the wave propagation
function was analyzed due to the difficulties of using PGD in a statistical model when ground
deformations are often localized and not always recorded in databases. The HAZUS®-MH 2.1
wave propagation model was used to estimate damages in the eight (8) presented scenarios and
then compared against recorded damage data. The residuals of the repair rates (observed versus
predicted) were plotted, and the results are shown in Figure 12 below. Generally, at larger PGV
values, the estimated repair rate is much greater than the repair rate observed in the event. The
difference seems to be exasperated at PGVs greater than 50 cm/s. At PGVs between 0 cm/s and
50 cm/s the residuals of the repair rates are generally clustered around zero.

From this analysis, the model appears to be overly conservative in estimating repair rates. The
conclusion that can be drawn from this analysis is that the PGV-based power function may lead to
overprediction in damages. It should be stated again that this model is meant to derive damages
from PGDs from a separate, PGD-based equation, that is to be used in conjunction with the PGVbased equation to arrive at the complete damage profile of a pipe network. This would only further
exasperate the discrepancy between observed and estimated repair rates, especially at larger PGV
values. As previously stated, the effectiveness of the PGD-based model was not analyzed for the
purposes of this study. However, as in the analysis of the Eidinger, 2001 model, the wave
propagation damage function of the HAZUS®-MH 2.1 model was analyzed using a dataset
screened for areas with little to no observed PGDs. The results (Figure 13) show that the damage
equation generally overestimates repairs (negative residual), especially at higher PGV values,
supporting the conclusions made from the original dataset.

35

Residual analysis of repair rate using wave propogation model
presented in Hazus
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Figure 12. Residuals of observed repair rates versus predicted repair rates from the fragility functions used in the HAZUS software.
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Residual analysis of repair rates using wave propogation model
presented in HAZUS in areas where PGD is not significant
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Figure 13. Residuals of observed repair rates versus predicted repair rates from the model presented in HAZUS®-MH 2.1 for data points
where little to no PGDs were observed.
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4.1.3

Results of Model Presented in Bellagamba, Bradley, Wotherspoon, & Hughes

(2019)
The pertinent data regarding the earthquake and pipeline (PGV, CRR, material, and diameter) was
used to derive coefficients for the Bellagamba, Bradley, Wotherspoon, & Hughes (2019) model.
The model was then used to estimate the number of repairs in the waterline. This was compared
to the actual damage recorded in the reviewed literature and records. Figure 14 shows the residual
plot of repair rates of water lines for each event (the difference between the estimated repair rates
and observed repair rates). As shown in Figure 14, the residuals of the repair rates are generally
bounded between +0.2 and -1.0 repairs per km, however, the model seems to overestimate repair
rates in general (residuals are negative). At PGVs less than 30 cm/s the residuals are small and
are generally bounded between +/- 0.05 repairs/km (Figure 15). The residual analysis suggests
that the model could potentially be overfit to the Christchurch earthquake events, the events by
which it was developed and validated. As detailed previously, a k-fold regression analysis was used
to develop the model and coefficients for the PGV-based and CRR-based fragility relations
presented in Bellagamba, Bradley, Wotherspoon, & Hughes (2019). Because data from outside the
event was not used to validate the model it is possible for the model to not have predictive
capabilities outside of the calibrated events.

The model developed in Bellagamba, Bradley, Wotherspoon, & Hughes (2019) is complex in
accounting for multiple significant variables that have been known to affect pipeline performance
during an earthquake. In general, complex models can be misleading; although they account for
more variables and parameters, the accuracy of predictions is often not changed significantly by
manipulating the values of some parameters. To determine what coefficients have greater influence
in the model, a tornado plot was created of each of the coefficients presented in the model (Figure
16). The baseline for coefficients came from the cast iron fragility function with diameters between
80 mm and 300 mm while using an assumed known CRR value of 0.2 and a PGV of 50 cm/s. The
plot was created by manipulating one coefficient by +/- 20% while leaving the rest unchanged and
recording the change in damage estimation. Though coefficients for the model are not continuous
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(see Table 4), the methodology shows the significance of each variable in estimating repair rates.
For readability of the graph, the x-axis is bounded at 2 repairs/km, however manipulating
coefficients a4 and c4 produce much repair-rate values. Repair rate values for each manipulation
are shown at the base of each bar. The x-axis is set at the repair rate value from the unmanipulated
cast iron pipe equation (0.372 repairs/km).

The results of the sensitivity analysis (Figure 16) shows the most sensitive coefficients in the model
pertain to the backbone PGV-based and CRR-based functions. The other variables are less
significant in affecting the repair rate when adjusted by +/-20%. The extra parameters seem to only
complicate the equation which could be better corrected using correction factors like the fragility
functions presented in Eidinger (2001) and HAZUS®-MH 2.1.

Results suggest that this model should be recalibrated across other earthquake events.
Coefficients and their significance should also be analyzed across events to determine their validity
and purpose in the model. Decreasing the parameters to only account for the significant coefficients
(PGV and CRR dependent backbone functions) could create a more useful modeling tool for utility
providers and engineers.
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Residual analysis of repair rate using model presented in
Bellagamba et al. (2019)
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Figure 14. Residuals of observed repair rates versus predicted repair rates from the model presented in Bellagamba et al. (2019)
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Figure 15. Residuals of observed repair rates versus predicted repair rates from the model presented in Bellagamba et al. (2019) from 0
cm/s to 30 cm/s.

41

30
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Sensitivity analysis of the coefficients presented in the Bellagamba et al (2019). repair
rate model
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Figure 16. Sensitivity analysis of the coefficients used in the model presented in Bellagamba et al. (2019).
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4.1.4

Comparison of Model Results

Comparing the different types of fragility functions across the same data set allows us to conclude
a variety of things regarding the modeling of fragility functions for water lifeline systems during a
seismic event. As mentioned in previous sections, the Eidinger (2001) and HAZUS®-MH 2.1
models are meant to account for damage due to PGDs with PGD-based power functions in addition
to the analyzed PGV-based functions used to estimate damage caused by wave propagation. The
model presented in Bellagamba, Bradley, Wotherspoon, & Hughes (2019) utilizes a CRR-based
power function to account for damages caused by PGDs. For the purposes of this study, PGD and
CRR were not accounted for in estimating damages to the system. Results were expected to be
skewed towards underestimating damages in areas highly affected by PGDs such as liquefaction
and lateral spreading. The results show that the models presented in HAZUS®-MH 2.1 and
Bellagamba, Bradley, Wotherspoon, & Hughes (2019) trend towards overestimating damages at
all PGV values instead of the expected underestimation. The underestimation of repair rates is
prominent in the Eidinger (2001) model, particularly when analyzing events with little evidence of
observed PGDs. When comparing the models, the results suggest that the Eidinger (2001) function
does well in accounting for damages to the system caused by wave propagation and should be
complimented by an additional fragility function that accounts for damages caused by PGD. The
PGV-based equations presented in HAZUS®-MH 2.1 and Bellagamba, Bradley, Wotherspoon, &
Hughes (2019) are overestimating damages caused by wave propagation alone and additional
damages caused by PGDs would only further skew the results of the model to overestimate
damage to the system.

The wave propagation functions were further explored to determine the cause of the discrepancies
between the Eidinger (2001) model and the HAZUS®-MH 2.1 and Bellagamba, Bradley,
Wotherspoon, & Hughes (2019) models. The HAZUS®-MH 2.1 and Bellagamba, Bradley,
Wotherspoon, & Hughes (2019) models utilized a power function PGV-based function to estimate
repair rates caused by wave propagation. The fragility function from Eidinger (2001) utilized a linear
function of PGV to determine the repair rates. Both models using a power function of PGV
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overestimate repair rates at PGV values greater than +/-50 cm/s. There was limited data outside
of the Eidinger (2001) study with PGV values above 50 cm/s to verify the linear function used in
Eidinger (2001) at greater PGV values. However, the overestimation of the power functions
suggests that a linear PGV function might be more accurate in estimating damages beyond a
threshold value for PGV. Additionally, the overestimation of repair rates using the PGV-based
power functions would be amplified by the addition of damages caused by PGD. Additional studies
should validate the type of PGD function (linear, power, etc.) to be used. As mentioned previously,
predicting PGD values across a region can be difficult. Models that attempt to account for PGD
using a factor such as CRR (as in Bellagamba, Bradley, Wotherspoon, & Hughes, 2019) or a
discretized liquefaction susceptibility or resistance measure (as in Cubrinovski, et al., 2014) may
be easier to use in estimating damages caused by PGD and should be further evaluated in
subsequent studies.

Overall, this research suggests that models for estimating damages to water lifeline systems
caused by wave propagation should use linear PGV-based functions. Accounting for different types
of pipe material and joints should be done using coefficients that modify the backbone function.
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Chapter 5
CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH
Existing models were evaluated against a dataset from earthquakes across different locations to
determine the accuracy of wave propagation equations in estimating damages to water lifeline
systems. Results from the modeling efforts inform conclusions regarding the development of
fragility functions for water lifeline systems. Questions and research ideas are proposed for
subsequent studies to enhance the conclusions of this study.

5.1

Conclusions

The development of fragility functions that estimate damages for water lifeline systems in
earthquake events should account for two main parameters: (1) damage caused by wave
propagation and (2) damage caused by permanent ground deformations (PGDs). Fragility
functions developed for estimating damages caused by wave propagation should be developed
using a linear PGV-based function as PGV power functions tend to overestimate damages at
large PGV values. At lower PGV values, the differences in damage estimates for linear and
power functions is not significant (Eidinger, 2001). Functions regarding PGD were not evaluated
for the purposes of this study.

Additional parameters regarding pipe material, pipe diameter, soil type, and other contributing
factors to a water lifeline system’s performance during an earthquake can be accounted for with
factors that modify an equation. From the sensitivity analysis of the (Bellagamba, Bradley,
Wotherspoon, & Hughes, 2019) model, the pipe materials performance group (high or low) seems
to be the most significant parameter regarding the pipeline. This is reflected in the literature
review (see section 2.1.1

Pipeline Factors:) and in the modification factor tables presented

by Eidinger (2001) and FEMA. Modification factors should be developed to modify repair rate
functions based on a case-study review of pipe performance. Studied pipe materials should be
grouped into high performing or low performing groups based on a thorough literature review and
study of performance during earthquake events or by classifying them as brittle or ductile and
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assigning the category a correction coefficient to be used in conjunction with a backbone fragility
function. Although this methodology simplifies the estimation of damages, additional variables
have been shown to not significantly affect the results of the model (see Figure 16) and will
require users with less data to gather to accurately assess their water lifeline system’s
performance.

A source of difficulties in developing and calibrating fragility functions stems from inconsistent
data gathering and recording techniques. Models need to be developed using and calibrated
against site data from earthquake events. A systematic approach should be developed and
adopted by national and international agencies such as ASCE’s TCLEE group and EERI to
ensure consistent, thorough, and accurate assessments of waterlines after an earthquake. Terms
such as “damage”, “break”, and “repair” should be specified clearly and explicitly in qualitative
terms when possible. Other factors regarding system assessment should be considered and
evaluated such as leak rates and damages prior to earthquake loadings. Types of ground
deformation present should be noted for each site. More consistently gathered and thoroughly
recorded data will allow for better and more accurate model development which will lead to more
resilient water lifeline systems.

5.2

Further Research

Additional research should focus on the development of fragility functions that estimate damages
caused by PGDs to water lifeline systems. This research should explore what types of parameters
are significant in predicting ground deformations at induvial sites along a water pipe network that
can be easily gathered for predictive modeling purposes. This research topic should also explore
what functional forms of a PGD-based fragility function are most accurate in predicting damages
caused by PGD solely. Enhancing the conclusions drawn in this report, fragility functions that
holistically estimate a water system’s damage caused by both wave propagation and PGDs should
be analyzed.
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As governments continue to legislate that utility providers move towards recording their subsurface
utilities in GIS systems, fragility functions should adapt to utilize GIS systems to estimate damages
in lifeline systems. The versatility of GIS systems would allow things such as PGV, PGD, and other
contributing factors to be logged geographically, easing analyses, and enhancing the ability of
modeling tools to assess a variety of other lifeline systems and their interactions with each other
(i.e., electrical line outage contributing to a water pump outage). To better prepare our infrastructure
against all forms of disaster, we first need to understand the potential risks and mitigation measures
on both the individual system level, but also at an interconnected system level. Finding deficiencies
across interconnected lifeline systems can enhance the overall resiliency of a region.

Ultimately, frameworks need to be established (by governments, NGOs, professional associations,
private industry) and agreed upon on how to best prepare our communities against natural
disasters such as earthquakes; without established and adaptive frameworks for assessing
hazards, mitigating damages, and recovering better our communities will continue to be plagued
by disaster. As engineers and scientists, we must also consider how a changing climate, rising sea
levels, exasperated stratification of wealth, and historic (and continuing) inequalities will affect
future disasters and those affected by these disasters. Holistically analyzing disasters alongside
climate scientists, sociologists, anthropologists, engineers, and policy experts will aid in preparing
all of our communities to be more resilient to disasters of all types.
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